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Abstract
Religious extremism presents an ideological perspective found in most major religions
and is currently associated with various forms of religiously motivated acts of violence.
A conceptual framework is adopted to study the warning features of religious extremism and apply it to case studies of Nigeria, Uganda, and the Central African Republic
(CAR). The application of a religious jihadism model to Christianity provides a comparative basis for assessing Islamic radical jihadism, helping to understand religion
as a security threat, with particular reference to Christian contexts and examples.
Using extremist rhetoric and the mobilization of Christian rituals, members of religious groups attempt to renegotiate their position in the public space within a society
from which they are excluded due to political, social, and economic dynamics based
on their exclusion. This study finds no significant difference between Islamic jihad and
Christian jihad, as each seeks to politically exploit religion for political ends.
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1

Introduction

Since the events of September 2001 and the beginning of the global war against
terrorism, the prevailing literature on terrorism has tended to focus on studying

© Hamdy A Hassan, 2022 | doi:10.1163/15700666-12340216
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0Downloaded
license. from Brill.com04/22/2022 06:42:05AM
via free access

Religion as a Security Threat

427

extremist and violent movements associated with Islam. However, the phenomenon of religious extremism is witnessed by all religions and beliefs
(Pratt 2017; Mason and James 2010). Extremism and violence based on faith
exist in different parts of the African continent where the interpretation of
religious texts is employed as the main motive to justify the clashes with
the existing society. This applies to all major religions in Africa, including Christianity (Basedau 2017). Accordingly, this paper seeks to study the
impact of extremist Christian movements on African society, including their
vision of the ‘Other’, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. To accomplish this, it
will be necessary to define the concepts of jihad and new religious movements in the African experience. By comparing them with violent Islamic
jihadist movements, this paper aims to locate the religious factor in an array
of African conflicts.
The literature review shows that it is possible to distinguish between three
groups of scientific works that have dealt with Christian fundamentalism in
general and particularly in Africa. The first category discusses the historical
phenomenon of Christian jihad, starting with the Crusades and ending with
the emergence of the Christian extreme right. Caner and Caner (2004) offer a
realistic look at the dark side of Christian history in the form of the Crusades,
asserting that even prior to them Christian jihad was aimed at Jews with the
threat of ‘embrace the cross or die’. An important comparison is Pope Urban II’s
speech in 1095 CE with Osama bin Laden’s speech on February 23, 1998. Khaled
Diab (2007) argues that Christian fundamentalism and other conservative
Christian groups – known as the Christian Right in the United States – seek to
‘Christianize’ the mainstream. A vision of the church – state marriage may be
constructive. A ‘Christian nation’, which contrasts with modern secular values
such as Islamism, is far-fetched but still dangerous. In Christian Jihad Doner
(2012) provides an important dissection of the new Fundamentalist mind,
focusing primarily on its manifestations within Christianity. Pratt (2010) discusses the Fundamentalist model as applied to Islam as a comparative basis
for assessing Christian Fundamentalism and extremism, contributing to an
understanding of religious extremism and terrorism with special reference to
Christian contexts and examples.
The second category focuses on the African context. For example, using
a survey of attitudes of people living in 34 African countries, Adamczyk
and LaFree (2019) find that the effects of religiosity on the population’s
civic engagement and interest in violent political behavior are the same for
Muslims and Christians. Hock (2008) links Christian ‘fundamentalism’ with
new religious movements, which have become a major challenge to existing
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churches. This challenge has a global dimension. It is present not only in the
United States where radical conservative groups of Evangelical, Pentecostal, or
Charismatic provenance have emerged and gained popularity at the expense
of mainstream churches, but also in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Jordan
(2014) discusses how different theological agendas regarding race have been
employed in Africa. American ecclesiastical organizations have made Africa
an important battleground for defending apartheid and Western influence.
The third category focuses on case studies of violent Christian movements, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (Adam et al. 2007; Taylor
2019), the anti-balaka movement in the Central African Republic (CAR) (Kah
2016; Lombard 2016), and the rebellions that used Christian jihad in southern
Nigeria (Omenka 2011; Pérouse de Montclos 2021).
Perhaps the most serious problem posed by radical religious movements,
this study argues, is the ongoing conflict between Christians and adherents of
other faiths, particularly Islam and traditional religions in many African countries. Despite the goodwill and calls for tolerance from many religious leaders,
all indications are that conflicts along religious lines of communication will
be the most pressing issue in the next decade. This article focuses on three
case studies: the Christian movements in southern Nigeria, the LRA in northern Uganda, and the anti-balaka militias in the CAR. Such groups are motivated in their movement by Christian beliefs and aim to create a new world
that will bring about the kingdom of God on earth. The reason for focusing on
these cases is that they represent radical or nonstate armed movements that,
in different ways and according to their respective circumstances, have used
religion as a tool in times of discontent and conflict.
Accordingly, this study, which is mainly based on qualitative analysis tools
in collecting information, aims to answer the following questions: 1) What are
the factors that drive the emergence of extremist Christian jihadism in Africa?
2) Does adherence to Christian symbols and slogans in public discourse lead to
religious extremism? and 3) How does extremist Christianity express the identity and self-definition crisis from which African societies suffer? To address
these questions this study is divided into four main parts. The first discusses
the theoretical framework for understanding the general context of the crisis
of Christian extremism in Africa, while the other three sections discuss case
studies of Nigeria, Uganda, and CAR. To help us understand the factors related
to violent religious extremism in Africa and the application of the Jihadism
model to Christianity, the following sections address the role of religion in
security issues and the nature of violent Christian movements in Africa from a
case study perspective.
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The Theoretical Framework: Understanding Religion as a
Security Threat

African people are religious by nature. If they are not Muslims then they
believe in Christ, and if that is not the case as well they practice rituals that are
expressed in one way or another in traditional African culture.1 Historically, the
roots of Christianity in Africa go back to the first century AD when its teachings
spread south through the lands of Nubia. The Coptic and Ethiopian churches
are considered among the oldest Christian churches on the continent (Baur
1994; Isichei 1996), which means that the presence of Christianity preceded
the introduction of colonization and modern missionaries.2 However, despite
these deep Christian roots, Africa witnessed new religious movements and
cults. Between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries Western missionaries
began arriving in Africa. These missionaries frequently converted white settlers,
Asian laborers, and educated Africans to Christianity. The Catholic, Anglican,
Presbyterian, and Pentecostal churches were prized as pioneers, although the
Methodist and Baptist churches came to Africa later and enjoyed more success
among tribal groups of traditional religions. In the face of marginalization and
other negative effects of Western colonialism, independent African churches
emerged that differed from Western expressions of Christianity.3 Some African
splinter groups, such as Legio Maria in Kenya, have become new religious
movements that believe in the ideas of the African Messiah or the Black Jesus
(Meyer 2004).
In terms of belief and principle, the saying, ‘Give what is Caesar’s to Caesar,
and what is God’s to God’ (Matthew 22: 21; Luke 20: 25) was the basis for the
concept of separation of church and state in Christian society. This view was
reinforced by the teachings of St. Paul to the Romans, that every person must
be subject to the governing authorities because there is no authority except that
which is established by God. In general, Christians tend to interpret the New
Testament in a pacifist manner, believing that they are obligated to ‘obey’ their
rulers and not deviate from their authority. However, many religious cults, such
as liberation theology, have challenged this kind of interpretation. The Book of
Joshua has long been the starting point for the concept of jihad in the Bible.
Joshua … speaks of brutal conquest, confiscating the land of an indigenous people, and acts of wholesale slaughter. Many readers squirm
when reading Joshua…. Just as disturbing is the concept of a crusading,
nationalistic God who fights wars for one ethnic group at the expense
of another. The modern reader may be tempted to dismiss Joshua as
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nothing more than a theological justification for the forceful appropriation of land that rightfully belongs to another people.
Kuiper 2012, 15

Interpreting this classic example of jihad in the Old Testament helps distinguish the similarities and differences between the jihad of the Bible and that
of the Qur’an. At the same time, understanding the context in which the sacred
text appears reflects the ethnic, territorial, and sometimes warlike nature of
the Hebrew Bible.
For the purpose of this study Christian authenticity refers to a moral pursuit that requires total obedience and the acceptance of God’s will. It demands
total commitment that affects all aspects of the believers’ lives. In addition,
religious extremism can be defined as an ideological commitment that is
expressed through certain actions that demonstrate deep loyalty to a belief
system. This often leads to group-based violence that can be incited by perceived injustice. It is noticeable that religious extremism in its various forms
stems and thrives from both global and local factors (Arefin and Ritu 2021;
Pratt 2010). Mainstream discourses on religious extremism usually focus on
the international security narrative from a reductionist perspective. That is
why, in addition to considering global political drivers, it is imperative to place
religious extremism in its local and regional context. Accordingly, this study
adopts the human security approach that gives primacy to human beings and
their complex social and economic interactions (Gregoratti 2018). It can be
argued that human security as such may constitute a global ethic by protecting
human dignity and safety.
In this study the concept of cults refers to the existence of controversial religious groups that are in a state of tension with established religious traditions
and society in general. Since the word ‘cult’ has negative connotations, many
scholars prefer to use the term ‘new religious movements’. The term ‘cults’
means ‘religious movements that represent the new and non-traditional religions in society’ (Cowan and Bromley 2015). In the African context these cults
are complex and intertwined because they often combine beliefs and practices
from other cultures and religious traditions to create their own unique blend
(Rodney and Bainbridge 1987).
The danger of the new Christian religious cults in Africa appeared on two
occasions. First, it was exemplified by the Kanungu incident in March 2000,
which led to the suicide of about one thousand people by setting themselves
on fire. The members of this cult seemed to believe that the end of the world
was about to happen. Why? Simply because their leaders apparently received
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visions of Jesus Christ telling them about the end of the world (Brennan 2002).
Second, an incident that occurred around the same time was associated with
the International Church of Christ, a very aggressive American evangelical
group that often focuses its activities on the campus of the University of Cape
Town. This cult relies on imposing the rules of evangelism, tithing, baptisms,
and internal marriages of members of the group only; offenders are doomed
to hell. Accordingly, this sect calls for the conversion of any person, including
Muslims and followers of other Christian churches, since none of them know
the truth of the Bible and are not biblical Christians (Religious Cult Recruits
SA Students n.d.).
In general, there has been a changing face to religious violence over time in
modern African reality, a region that has been fairly stable in terms of peaceful
faith coexistence. Africa has not historically experienced religious wars since
traditional religions were like isolated islands and had no missionary function.
Despite small religious conflicts, there have been no major wars or conflicts
based on religion in the last decade. Political religious movements were not
a concern for the postcolonial secular state in Africa. However, things took a
different turn as signs of religious violence began to increase on the continent.
This may become one of the main sources of instability and human insecurity
in the future. If this potential threat is not taken seriously it could alter the
long-term dynamics of Christian–Muslim relations in Africa.
Most of the countries threatened by religious violence are concentrated in
the Sahel region and beyond, with a strong Islamic presence in its northern
regions and a Christian concentration in the south (Hassan 2020a). An additional factor is the influence from North Africa. There is also a general feeling of
political and economic marginalization as a result of hegemony over the political and administrative apparatus of the state by either party. It is noteworthy
that the past decade has witnessed an escalation of religious or interfaith tensions and sometimes violence in West, Central, and East Africa. While some
of these tensions have been contained, others have escalated. For example,
the Ivorian conflict is often portrayed as a confrontation between a Muslim
north and a Christian south. With regard to the current religious demographic
composition, this is only partially true. It is correct that the vast majority of
northerners are Muslims (56 percent). However, there are a large number of
Muslims in the south (35 percent as a result of internal migration movements
between north and south, as well as waves of migration from the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso and Mali (Miran-Guyon 2006). In 1998 official
sources publicly stated that they feared the consequences of the increasing
number of Muslim immigrants. Accordingly, religious demographics and their
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intersection with regional identities have become the subject of contention in
the political debate over Ivorian identity and citizenship since 1993.
It is no secret that the main influence on interfaith relations is due to the
fact that extremism from one religious group tends to encourage extremism
from other religious groups. This occurred in Nigeria during the Biafra War,
and the reaction of Christian organizations to the imposition of Islamic Sharia
laws in the north. The case of armed Christian organizations directed against
Muslims in the CAR provides another example. These conflicts can correspond
to the lines of sectarian and ethnic divisions, which can lead to the violent
targeting of some groups (Kagwanja 2014).
A distinction can be made between the two different types of Christian
violence in Africa and the reasons behind this violence. The first form is sectarian violence embodied in the dynamics of Muslim–Christian relations in
countries such as Nigeria and CAR. It begins as a political insurgency and then
becomes religious in character when one community engages in violence
against another on sectarian religious grounds. The second form of Christian
religious violence is carried out by extremist groups that practice killing in the
name of God, such as the LRA in Uganda and the anti-balaka group in the CAR.
The goal of these groups is to advance a specific cause in theological thought
and then engage in violent activity to achieve it, such as imposing a set of
behavioral standards with severe penalties for violators.
In Africa religion is closely related to people’s daily lives, and thus religious
affiliation is shaped and becomes a decisive factor in building social identity. This affiliation may create sharp differences between religious groups.
However, advocates of the concept of societal inequality in its various dimensions interpret interfaith violence as a specific consequence of the economic
and other policy-related inequalities that exist between religious groups. In
other words, this is the inequality that results in a particular religious group
perceiving itself as more marginalized and oppressed than other groups (Ellis
and ter Haar 2004). However, the basic assumption underlying this study is
that the main reason behind religious violence, in general, is the failure of
the postcolonial state in Africa since it is still a national project in progress
(Hassan 2020b). Extremist religious movements appear in the context of a
state crisis. The public sometimes welcome them as an alternative to the state
in its attempts to achieve security and stability because it is believed these
movements will be able to provide enforcement of the rule of law and establish stability. Based on the case studies of Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria,
Basedau et al. (2013) discuss the causes of higher levels of Christian–Muslim
violence that are attributable to economic and social inequality, and the
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overlapping or intersection of religious and ethnic boundaries that generate
grievances and violence between the two religions. This study also finds that
when theological ideas are politicized interreligious violence reaches its maximum expression (Basedau et al. 2013).
Some conceptual approaches to religious jihadism associate extremism
with violence committed at the group or individual level. This study adopts the
model presented by Kimball (2008). This model suggests that the five warning
features of religious extremism for individuals (i.e., personal beliefs) or groups
(i.e., as embedded in salient group norms) are belief in absolute truth, endorsement of blind obedience, a quest to establish utopia, belief that the end justifies the means, and a declaration of holy war. In the following sections this line
of interpretation is explored in relation to religious extremism. The three case
studies clearly reveal most of these warning signs of Christian jihadism.
3

Biafra and the Christian Rebellion in Nigeria

Although the literature focuses on examining the case of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and the Sahel region, some rebel groups in the southern areas use
a similar approach by employing religious arguments and claiming to be the
teachings of Christ to legitimize their rebellion. The idea of the Republic of
Biafra, framed by Christian religious arguments, continues to inspire the justification of the rebellion of many armed groups (Oyewole 2019). They learned
from the legacy of separatists who, between 1967 and 1970, insisted on upholding Catholic values in what they perceived as a Muslim genocide against
Christians, even though Nigeria’s head of state at the time, General Jacob
Gowon, was a Christian (Pérouse de Montclos 2021).
3.1
Holy War
Thousands of Eastern Christians residing in Nigeria were killed in the aftermath of the 1966 military coup. There have been deliberate attempts to ‘religiousize’ the conflict. The dominant discourse in the press and radio began
to focus on the ‘Muslim North’ and the ‘Christian South’, especially in the
eastern region. When the war broke out in Biafra in July 1967, Christian religious discourse was used extensively and effectively as propaganda for the war
(Omenka 2011). In its campaign to gain Christian support for its movement, the
separatist government of Biafra highlighted the religious division between the
North and East as an excuse to reject the idea of a united state. The amalgamation of the Muslim North with the Christian and pagan South has been likened
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to a hypothetical case in which Egypt and Ireland are merged together within
the framework of a united nation. The Catholic archbishop of Westminster,
Cardinal Heenan, states:
The problem is quite simply how to integrate the ancient emirates of the
North into the rest of the country to form a unitary state. It is a simple
matter of fact that nowhere in the world has [it] been possible to combine satisfactorily under a single central government, except in the cases
of imperial domination, Mohammedan, and non-Mohammedan states.
It would be otiose to draw up the list. An integral Mohammedan society
forms a closed society, and as such cannot be asked to accept a central
government over which it has no guaranteed control. Its cultural affinity
is with the rest of the Islamic world, and those who do not belong to this
world form a foreign element that can never be truly accepted into the
society. These incontrovertible sociological factors must be respected,
and any attempt to ignore them can only lead to failure.
Uche 2008, 114

3.2
God and Igbo Utopia
Igbo-majority areas in southeastern Nigeria, the heart of the former Biafra
region, are predominantly Roman Catholic. During the civil war the propaganda for Biafra focused largely on the religious aspect of the conflict, making it a conflict between Christians and Muslims (note that many Christian
clergymen supported Biafra). However, the reality is more complex. The secession of Biafra followed two bloody coups and a massacre against the Igbo in
the Muslim North, driving the Igbo refugees south into the area that would
become Biafra. The secession movement reflects Igbo’s desire for a separate
Igbo-dominated state. However, the aspirations related to controlling the oil
wealth that the region owned cannot be ignored in the motives behind the
Biafra crisis.
The Igbo people in the Biafra region were surrounded by Islamic emirates.
Accordingly, Igbo activists expressed their discontent by linking the political
and religious aspects in their dominant discourse. Since then, some of them
have presented themselves as belonging to one of the lost tribes of Israel. For
example, Nnamdi Kanu, one of the Biafra protest leaders who was arrested by
the government of President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015, states that he converted to Judaism while in prison. Other activists founded the Biafra Zionism
movement (Pérouse de Montclos 2021).
In general, protests against the actions of the Muslim ruling class in northern Nigeria have found some resonance within the Igbo groups in the diaspora.
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Social media and the ‘Voice of Biafra’ station, which broadcasts from the United
Kingdom, offer modern platforms to preach the goals of the rebel movements,
which are covered with a Christian religious facade. To the south along the
Atlantic coast of Nigeria, rebels fighting the government in the oil-producing
areas of the Niger Delta were not excluded. They are like the Igbo in that some
Ijaw in the region compared themselves to the Jews, followers of Moses who
were able to break the shackles of ‘slavery’. This indicates their desire to be
liberated from the yoke of Muslims in the north.
3.3
The End Justifies the Means
The Niger Delta Avengers group, which emerged in 2016, denounced the tyranny of the federal government and called President Muhammadu Buhari an
‘Egyptian pharaoh’. This rhetoric is familiar to Salafi jihadists who criticized
autocratic rulers in the Muslim world. In addition, we can remember the writer
‘Ken’ Ken’ Saro-Wiwa, who led the first protest marches of the Ogoni Survival
Movement.4 In 1995 the ruling military council, led by General Sani Abacha,
executed him by hanging along with eight other people (Osha 2006).
It is possible that the violence of the Niger Delta armed groups was a reaction
against the violent jihadist movement represented by Boko Haram. Izon Ebi,
the spokesperson of the Niger Delta Revolutionary Crusaders (NDRC), stated:
We want to alert Nigerians and the world that the Islamization plot has
been proven by the Boko Haram new leader Abu Masab el Barnaw that
their new mission is to kill all Christians and burn down all churches. But,
we want to warn them that … the Niger Delta youths, in this 21st century
will not accept the killing of innocent Christians or burning of churches.
That if they try it [i.e., kill Christians or burn down church buildings] in
the north or any part of Nigeria, we the Niger Delta youths will not see
[i.e., accommodate] any Muslim or mosque in the Niger Delta.
Ezigbo 2018, 241

Perhaps the difference between Christian jihad and radical Islamic jihad is
that the Christian insurgencies in southern Nigeria do not seek to impose a
Christian state, unlike Boko Haram jihadists who dream of restoring the nation
of the caliphate. However, there are several indications that political discourse
is strongly influenced by religion in Nigerian Christian movements. The evangelical cities that developed on the outskirts of big cities in the south became
city-states within the state. In 1990 rebels, who by some accounts were backed
by evangelical churches in the Niger Delta, staged a coup attempt in order
to ‘purify’ Nigeria and expel the Muslim-majority northern states from the
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federation. Some armed groups formed of ‘neosectarians’ try to emulate the
violent jihadist practices of ISIS and al-Qaeda fighters. In the Igbo regions, for
example, rival groups sometimes behead people and kill priests, which indicates the mixing of religious and criminal motives (Pérouse de Montclos 2021).
Returning to the religious variable, we find that ethnic and religious pluralism
in Nigeria is one of the most influential factors. As a result, religion has gained
political significance and generated tension in Nigeria due to its pluralism.
While there are three major religions in Nigeria, religious and political conflicts
largely revolve around the activities of Islam and Christianity and their interrelationships. The history of religious sentiment and involvement in regional and
national politics aptly illustrates its activities in post-independence Nigerian politics (Ezigbo 2018). The search and competition for political power have occurred
in part within the framework of religion in ways that have reinforced ethnic and
regional animosity. Thus religious identity at the individual and group levels is
in conflict with other allegiances, such as race, class, and gender, in ways that
further exacerbate the polarity between Islam and Christianity and the question of political control in Nigeria (Adogame 2015). There is no doubt that this
tension is clearly related to the relentless growth of Islamic and Christian roles,
which led to the growth of a culture of religious violence, especially in northern Nigeria. The influence of religion on politics has created an atmosphere of
mutual distrust and suspicion to the extent that almost all national issues are
approached through a religious lens. Political practice in Nigeria since independence proves that social, economic, and political imperatives have a strong
influence on both the politicization of religion and the religiosity of politics
in Nigeria. The scramble for political power has occurred partly within the
framework of religion in ways that exacerbate ethnic and regional contradictions and worsen misunderstandings between Islam and Christianity. In this
case, religious discourse plays an important role in the political mobilization
processes and could lead to violence, as shown in the following section.
4

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda

The LRA has been active in northern Uganda since 1986, with its fighters carrying out brutal attacks on the civilian population, engaging in kidnapping,
and recruiting children to the movement. Today the LRA is estimated to number only between 500 and 5,000 fighters, but it appears to be strong enough
to fight the national armies of Uganda, southern Sudan, and eastern Congo
(International Crisis Group (ICG) 2011; Vinci 2005). This army is one of the most
mysterious insurgency groups in postcolonial Africa. From the early stages of
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the insurgency, the LRA claimed as their main objective the establishment of a
government based on the biblical Ten Commandments or other eschatological
goals (Branch 2005; Vinci 2005).
4.1
God and Holy War
Many accounts emphasize the charismatic qualities of Joseph Kony (Beevor
2017) that give him the power of magic over his followers and soldiers. Kony
initially joined the opposition Ugandan People’s Defense Forces. At the time
Kony was just a priest in a Catholic church. Many Acholi youths at that time
joined the rebellion as a result of the abuse of power by the National Resistance
Army. Kony refused the peace agreement with the Ugandan government, and
he and his comrades decided to continue the war against the government of
Yoweri Museveni (van Acker 2004).
Although little is known about the real purposes of the LRA because it seldom makes public statements and Joseph Kony hardly speaks publicly, those
purposes can be identified from the testimonies of former rebels, peace brokers, and the characteristics of his fighters’ practices. This evidence sheds
light on the Christian religious character of the LRA: it wants to fulfill the Ten
Commandments of the people, and Kony likens himself to Moses and Jesus
Christ as he leads his people to the Promised Land. Former LRA rebels speak
of many religious rituals within the movement such as baptisms or sacrifices
(Adam et al. 2007). The fighters of the LRA group also wear long beads on their
chests and recite verses from the Bible before battle.
The emergence of the Holy Spirit movement led by Alice Lukina represented
a significant shift in the evolution of the conflict in northern Uganda. This
woman claimed to represent the soul of an Italian who was killed during the
First World War. This spirit was put in the body of ‘Alice’ on 25 May 1985 (Allen
1991). While first claiming that she could heal the sick, she soon announced
the founding of the Holy Spirit Movement. This movement was based on the
general belief that the Acholi people are threatened with extinction and that
immunizing these people from destruction requires adopting a new strategy.
Lukina believed that maintaining the survival of the Acholi requires the establishment of an unnatural superpower Acholi. With the help of some defected
National Army soldiers, the movement was able to achieve limited victories
over government forces, which supported the impression that Lukina possessed superhuman strength (Hassan 2020c.).
There is no doubt that the world of Acholi is full of symbols and spiritual values. It is saturated with spirits, ghosts, and occult forces. The disasters inflicted
on the Acholi people, particularly in the aftermath of the collapse of the Milton
Obote regime, have led to the belief that the conflict is nothing more than
Journal of Religion in Africa 51 (2021) 426–451
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self-purification. Lukina also claimed that she possessed the Holy Spirit, which
enabled her to eliminate the evil spirits of those who were killed in battle and
replace them with angels. This religious movement was short lived since it was
quickly countered in 1987. The repercussions of this movement were far-reaching
in the development of the conflict in northern Uganda (Branch 2005).
After defeating the Holy Spirit Movement, Kony announced that he had
inherited Alice Lukina’s spirit. However, Kony has not been able to garner the
massive public support that Lukina once had. In 1988 Kony initially named
his movement the Ugandan Christian Democratic People’s Army, but soon
changed its name to the Uganda Christian Democratic People’s Army. In 1991
Kony changed his movement’s name a third time, to the Lord’s Resistance
Army. Kony’s ideas and beliefs fluctuated. He sometimes appeared to believe
in the ideas of the Holy Spirit Movement, especially its Christian components
that reject magic and sorcery; at other times he rejected it and practiced other
religious rituals (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010).
In any case, Kony was able to develop the ideas of the Holy Spirit Movement.
He was able to coalesce the LRA around the idea of a radical change to the
Acholi from within, similar to a moral crusade. This transformation made the
process violent; it seems that through this component of faith Kony has given
religious and moral legitimacy to his armed movement. Central to the thought
of the LRA is the fact that Kony claims to possess different spirits and sees himself as the one who must convey the message of the Holy Spirit. Through the
concept of spirits Kony comes into direct contact with God as his mouthpiece.
Therefore the LRA sees its struggle as one directed by God for the salvation of
all Acholi people. This divine and religious dimension is manifested by a broad
set of religious rules and rituals, which spirits – and thus God – have revealed
to the universe. Most of these spiritual rules are directly related to Christianity
and traditional Acheulean practices. Perhaps the most famous of these is the
‘Ten Commandments’ in which the LRA claims to be fighting for a government
based on the Ten Commandments. In addition, the LRA has a wide range of
rules, introduced by spirits through Joseph Kony himself, that must be obeyed
blindly. Many of these rules are anachronistic, such as fasting from food and
drinking, or sexual abstinence, while others are perpetual, such as informing
and explaining the actions of the LRA to its members.
4.2
Blind Obedience
According to Titeca:
There were rules for everything in the bush. For example, an important
rule of the spirit was that everything must be done at speed 99! You must
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do it very quickly, so the enemy cannot get you. Also, walking must be
on 99. They tell you, for example, you go to Lacor, we give you one hour.
You must do anything as fast as possible and keep the time they tell you!
Cooking must be done in thirty minutes and going for washing as well.
Because if you delay with cooking, you are going to meet your enemy. So
you need the speed!
2010, 63

One of the ex-leaders describes the prebattle ritual as follows:
The holy spirit reported to the chairman [Kony], who selected the soldiers who could be on ‘stand-by’. He picked the controllers. He ordered
them to mix this type of herbs (sic), mixed them in powder form, put
them in a basin together with water and Moo ya. The controllers stand
near the basin and splash the soldiers, one by one. When the soldiers are
near the basin, they put their guns three times in the basin and women
four times. You put the gun up and you say, ‘God, you are stronger than
anything in the world; therefore, the power belongs to you’. We also sing
songs like ‘Polo Polo’ [‘Heaven should come to rescue us in our lives, and
we shall never leave the way to heaven’] because when we sing, we do
not even hear gunshots! When you finish, you cannot believe what you
have done. You say: What has happened? How did I do all this? It is as if
you are not the one who did it. It is a force that you have in you: it gives
you courage and strength! … All the spirits are with Kony, but if you are
going to the battle, you feel that something is with you. On the battlefield,
they will be doing their duty and take care of you: everyone will feel very
strong.
Titeca 2010, 64

On the other hand, biblical texts were employed in the process of LRA fighters’
spiritual education. For example, a former LRA commander in charge of girls
and women argued the following:
For him [Kony], he says it is God who sent him to kill people so nobody
should stop him. You know this thing is very difficult to understand, as
he [Kony] refers us to the Bible. Because he says God does what he wills,
and what he wants to do, He does. If he wants to kill, he sends a person
on earth, as he sent in the past. He also said in the past God sent rain to
clear and finish people and it rained for 40 days during Noah’s time, and
also Gomorrah was destroyed. Many were killed. That was the anger of
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God. In Kony’s time, God has sent the Holy Spirit, and it is the one which
is doing the work through Kony.
Nkabala 2017, 94

The purpose of using these violent biblical texts was to achieve two crucial
beliefs in the spiritual education of the movement’s fighters. First, Kony has
been sent by God to confirm God’s word. Second, the Acholi can be saved
through purification. If the Acholi believe that Kony’s spirit is from God, then
they will accept Kony as the only soul that can save them. This Savior will be
able to fulfill his mission only through strict obedience to the Word of God and
its representative on earth, Joseph Kony. This may reflect the concept of blind
obedience and religious justification for violence.
Effective leaders are often charismatic, but evil can occur when leaders have
the power to enforce obedience. The leader of the LRA was able to create a
community that was increasingly disengaged from the larger society so that its
members became a huge camp or self-enclosed community.
4.3
Purification and Utopia
Additionally, the LRA argues that many Acholi do not obey God because their
culture has become ‘impure’: they use witchcraft practices and cooperate with
a corrupt government. As a result, the LRA directs its violence not only against
the government’s army but primarily against the Acholi people. The LRA, especially the kidnapped children, is the seed of a new ‘pure’ generation that follows the Word of God.
As this study argues, the conflict in northern Uganda began as a result of the
marginalization of northern Uganda in general and the Acholi people in particular. In other words, this is a problem of nation-state building in the postcolonial era. In the LRA’s armed rebellion, which was a reaction against this
marginalization, religion (Christian rites) played a crucial role in the process
of creating an alternative ethnic and religious identity. This process of identity
formation occurs through the use of religious rituals and the use of violence
against the ‘Other’, resulting in influences on different levels. First, this renewed
spiritual identity is important for achieving cohesion within the group; it creates internal discipline and prevents rebels from escaping. Second, the ethnic
and religious identity that the LRA established may save the Acholi ‘spiritually’,
but on a secular level it may lead to their destruction, especially ‘outsiders’,
the nonbelievers who do not join the ranks of the LRA and should therefore
be killed by the believers. This suggests the concept of takfir in the philosophy of violent Islamic jihadist groups. Third, there is a mixture of religious and
Acholi traditions in terms of rituals and practices of external violence, not only
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in redefining Acholi identity but also to ensure that the Acholi community in
general understands the impetus behind LRA violence.
We propose to enrich the study of religious extremism in Africa as observed
in the cases of Nigeria and Uganda by opening a perspective that accurately
addresses the societal factors that lead to feelings of marginalization and
victimization by certain social groups. The practices of employing religious
discourse can be explored in political terms to understand the process of radicalization. The case of CAR in the next section shows that Christian extremists
were seeking a holy war fueled by anger regarding perceived injustice.
5

Anti-Balaka in the Central African Republic

As the previous cases suggest, ‘Christian terrorism’ takes the form of terrorist
acts largely through militias that invoke Christian motives or goals for their
actions. As such, Christian extremists in Africa also rely on the interpretation
of the Bible, often citing the Old and New Testaments to justify violence and
murder. It is noteworthy that the extremism of the Christian faith is a growing
phenomenon in Africa’s internal wars, especially in what is referred to as the
‘arc of insecurity’ extending from Somalia to Mauritania. Christian ‘revenge
terrorism’ reached its climax in the political crisis that engulfed the CAR,
beginning in 2012 (Bellal 2014).
6

A Quest to Establish Utopia

The defining moment in the political history of the CAR was that the Muslim
rebel alliance, known as Séléka, was able to oust President François Bozizé in
March 2013. The rebel alliance installed its leader, Michel Djotodia, as the first
Muslim president of the CAR. Although Djotodia announced the dissolution
of Séléka in September 2013, this militia rejected the decision and engaged in
large-scale violence.5
There is no doubt that this shift cemented the political foundation for the
emergence of retaliatory violence by Christian militias. The Christians of the
CAR organized into militias known as ‘anti-balaka’. This name means ‘antimachete’ or ‘anti-sword’ in the local languages of Mandja and Sango. This name
was often used to describe vigilante units that local communities set up to fight
thieves, strangers, rebels, and poachers. It may also refer to the French word
for bullets (balles) because the people of the CAR resisted the Kalashnikov
assault, which was often used against them. ‘Anti-balaka’ is also a general term
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for those who resisted the brutal Séléka insurgency. The term roughly means
‘indomitable’, which refers to a power allegedly bestowed by the charms that
hang around the necks of most members (Kah 2016).
The United Nations warned of ‘genocide’, which prompted the intervention of the International Support Mission. When Djotodia was unable to control the security situation, he submitted his resignation and was replaced by
Catherine Samba-Panza as the country’s interim president. Nevertheless, antibalaka militias continued sectarian violence against Muslim civilians, forcing
thousands of them to flee the country. Research by human rights groups has
revealed that members of the Christian anti-balaka committed massacres and
targeted killings against Muslim civilians. Muslims, who compose 15 percent
of the population, were forced to flee to the areas that the Séléka rebels controlled and neighboring countries such as Chad.
The events provoked by the Séléka and anti-balaka militias, as well as the
deployment of international forces have contributed to the exacerbation and
restructuring of public perceptions that pose the question of identity and religion around pervasive violent practices, which are largely unprecedented in
CAR history. Evoking the division between ‘Christians’ and ‘Muslims’ clearly
shows this interrelationship between violent practices (e.g., mutual accusations, extrajudicial executions, murder, revenge, forced displacement) and the
motives and perceptions that underlie them. Most of them are reinforced by
the act of violence itself. However, the significance of this division and the process that gradually generated it in CAR society remains problematic, and invites
us to look beyond simple religious affiliations. This can be done by questioning
the true meaning of these sects, both Christian and Islamic, in the eyes of the
population. This task is made more difficult by the fact that research relating
specifically to the history of the CAR and the political crisis of 2014–2021 is
limited. Even though the country is located in a turbulent region, it lies at the
center of various political and economic interests and complex dynamics that
redefine the relationship between Western powers and their partners in subSaharan Africa (Mayneri 2014).
The roots of this deteriorating situation lie in the recent history of the CAR,
which is characterized by the weakness of political parties and organizations,
and their increasing inability to exercise a true representative function within
civil society and access to regional groups. In addition, the ease of the frequent
use of weapons and the presence of external actors influence the country’s
political landscape.6 For example, even before Bozizé’s coup in 2003 his predecessor Patassé managed to thwart several coup attempts thanks to the support
he received on three occasions (in 2001, 2002, and 2003) from the Libyan forces
and the Congolese Liberation Movement led by Jean-Pierre Bemba. Between
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1996 and 1997 the country witnessed three successive rebellions, partly triggered by disadvantaged soldiers who did not receive their salaries. However,
their demands quickly took on political, ethnic, and religious dimensions,
which were revealed by the division among the elites.
Since 2011 the government of General François Bozizé has been spreading
the concept of Islamophobia and encouraging a national discourse against
Muslims. There have been persistent references to the presence of Sudanese
Janjaweed and other Chadian Islamists in the rebel movements and the Séléka
Alliance. The main theme behind the clashes in Bangui in 2011 was the Central
African crisis of questioning Muslims and their foreign origins, especially
Chadians (Fancello 2020). The rise in the Christian fundamentalist rhetoric of
churches in the CAR against Islam has continued through most of the postindependence years.
6.1
Toward Holy War
Like the Nigerian case, Central African presidents since independence have
used religion as a tool for political mobilization and fundraising. For example,
President Bokassa (1965–1979) converted to Islam and changed his name to
carry an Islamic character after a visit to Libya in September 1976, during which
he was promised a massive amount of aid by Muammar Gaddafi.7 It is apparent that the political elites relied on the educational institutions of the Roman
Catholic community as a means of advancement and class mobility. Although
Bokassa converted to Islam opportunistically, he and the nationalist leader
Barthélemy Boganda studied in Catholic missionary schools, the only institutions where they could obtain a quality education and thus improve their social
status. In addition, when the regime of President Kolingba (1981–1993) was collapsing in the early 1990s, he resorted to the political manipulation of religion
by establishing a ‘National Day of Fasting and Prayer’ on June 30 (Vlavonou
2021). President Patassé (1993–2003) was widely known as a preacher, and his
speeches regularly contained biblical references (Vlavonou 2021). President
Bozizé (2003–2013), ordained as the Grand Head of the Celestial Church of
Christ, was a follower of this branch of Pentecostalism. In 2003 he decided
by decree that December 31 would be a national day of fasting and prayer
(extended to three days beginning in 2004) in order to thank God and ask God
for forgiveness. Based on her fieldwork in CAR and Benin, Sandra Fancello
(2020) explains Bozizé’s involvement in transnational celestial networks and
his quest for power both within the church and within the CAR. During his
ten years in power he developed a rhetoric of warfare inspired by the spiritual
warfare of ‘Holy Jihad’ to free the country from its foreign and Muslim enemies.
This exacerbated the violent conflict between Muslims and Christians.
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6.2
The End Justifies the Means
The tendency of political elites to consolidate their power using religious discourse highlights not only the interaction between religion and politics in
the CAR but also the long-standing role of religious institutions in promoting
social progress. Indeed, the same political elites who have traditionally mobilized moral and religious discourse have often engaged in violent power struggles in the pursuit of authority and social mobility. For example, many cadres
of the administration of Bozizé were keen to attend prayers in these churches.
Some members of Bozizé’s government have hinted, rightly or wrongly, at the
supposed financing of the ‘Coalition of Radical Islamic Salafism’ and the presence of Boko Haram elements in the ranks of the Séléka. These accusations
may have been aimed at prompting Western intervention in the CAR in order
to maintain the collapsing Bozizé regime. However, this did not work out well
for him and his supporters, who tried to maintain power by various means.
The anti-Muslim rhetoric did not help unite the people of the CAR but
rather widened the gap that already exists in the country, especially between
the government and the many armed groups that emerged to defend the interests of their leaders. In addition, the interests of external parties such as Chad
and Sudan were, directly and indirectly, involved in the long-lasting political
crisis. Thus, the polarization of the conflict between Christians and Muslims
was gradually grafted onto old ethnic cleavages and presented Muslims as foreigners: ‘In the words of the anti-balaka and their “commanders”, the confessional identity helps to structure a discourse of autochthony where the Other
persecutor, who must be annihilated, simultaneously assumes the features of
the Muslim, as a foreigner, often from Chad’ (Fancello 2020, 188). Even François
Bozizé presented himself as a victim of foreigners.
However, the overthrow of transitional President Michel Djotodia on
10 January 2014, by pressure from the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), intensified counterinsurgency efforts and countered the
anti-balaka movement that had been formed to fight the brutal Séléka militia.
Both armed movements fought a war of a religious nature that led to threats to
split the CAR in two: the northern part for Muslims and the southern part for
Christians and non-Muslims. It should be noted that religious differences were
not the main origin of the crisis in the CAR, as this study confirms. The factors
of religion and national identity in the CAR were employed by the dominant
elites of the Séléka and anti-balaka militias to achieve political and economic
goals, taking advantage of the failure of the national state. This is the essence
of the crisis in the CAR, which has led to the emergence of separatist tendencies and the culture of exclusion.
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Conclusion

This study has attempted, through the cases of Nigeria, northern Uganda, and
CAR, to understand the various dimensions of the phenomenon of radical
Christian movements in Africa and to put them on the research agenda for
studying the phenomenon of violent religious extremism. It is no secret that
the dominant Western perspective on studies of religious extremism focuses,
for reasons that are not hidden, on violent Islamist jihadist movements such as
ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram. Importantly, this study sought to shed light
on the general context in which these militant Christian movements operate,
as well as on the role of religion – in this case Christianity – and the use of
religious symbols in local political mobilization processes.
Some general conclusions can be drawn from these three cases. First, the
various forms of orthodox Christianity have proven to provide an acceptable
alternative in filling the social and cultural void resulting from the national
state’s failure or the sense of historical grievances. In the case of eastern
Nigeria Christianity became a ‘strategy for liberation’, inspired by the spirit of
the Christian Republic of Biafra. In this sense, the religious variable can give
meaning to the context of the deeper processes of the social and economic
crisis and marginalization (the crisis of state-building in general), and thus can
offer new tools for understanding this context. In all three cases religious mobilizations were caused by various factors, such as Christian militancy (Northern
Uganda and CAR), the loss of socioeconomic status and a legacy of colonial
times (Acholi), marginalization, and subsequent exclusion in favor of dominant groups (Biafra and Niger Delta). The exclusion of certain groups from
political power and high levels of poverty created an ideal environment for the
rise of rebel groups in the CAR, while the use of religious rhetoric has legitimized the actions and practices of these movements, such as the demands for
secession in Nigeria.
Second, although the process of upholding Christian slogans and symbols
does not necessarily lead to religious extremism, various case studies reveal
that the possibility of this extremism is higher in situations where Christian
communities feel increasingly threatened by competing or numerically superior Muslim groups, such as in southern Nigeria or the CAR. Rituals and prayers
are usually designed to ask God for help in war and ritual blood sacrifice, a
prefiguration of the martyrdom of those fighting for a sacred cause. The risk
of losing a life in war for a sacred cause is offset by the promise of salvation in
the hereafter. Martyrdom has become the highest mark of religious devotion.
The fear of Islamic jihadist expansion in Nigeria and the massacres of Eastern
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Christians during the 1966 coup contributed to the emergence of Biafra’s
Christian identity with its desire for an independent state.
Third, the three cases also demonstrate how Christianity is employed to
achieve other political ends apart from dealing with marginalization processes
and historical grievances. Christianity here becomes central to the processes
of self-definition and the creation of a new identity, which helps achieve the
inner coherence of the movement and to define the nature of the relationship
with the ‘outside’. Notable in these operations is the use of collective symbols,
rules, and rituals such as a dedicated space for worship, group prayers that
lasted hours in the case of the LRA, or the rituals led by Sara Wiwa and his
nonviolent campaign for the emancipation of the Ogoni people.
Fourth, in the three cases discussed in this study other factors contributed
to the processes of Christian radicalization within the community. Take, for
example, the 1966 coup d’état and the massacre of Eastern Christians in Nigeria,
the failed Acholi coup, the consequent repression in Uganda in mid-1985, and
Christian-Muslim violence in the CAR in 2013. In this case, religion became
the main force for political mobilization, although the content and nature of
the religious messages are different. However, as in northern Uganda, while
Christian extremism and unpopular methods such as forced conversions and
kidnapping of child recruits led to internal divisions within the movement,
those divisions were also seen between the LRA, the Acholi people, and nonChristian communities.
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Notes
1 	The influence of traditional African religions on Christianity and Islam can be observed
in many ways such as the nature of interfaith relations, especially between Christians and
Muslims. The celebration of the traditional festivals brings various religious groups together
(Amanze 2012, 283). Based on this cultural encounter, Ali Mazrui argues that Africa’s triple
heritage is the result of the encounter of three cultures – the indigenous culture, Western
Christian culture, and Islamic culture (Mazrui 1986).
2 	Christianity first arrived in North Africa and then moved deeper into the heart of the continent. If we look at the three major blocs there are different Christianities in Africa: Coptic
Christianity, Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and the modern incarnation reflected in the
denominations transplanted in Africa through missionary work (Bongmba 2015).
3 	The rapid spread of African Independent Churches and the Fundamentalist/Charismatic
movements throughout sub-Saharan Africa has led to the development of radical millenarian sects that can turn violent or more self-destructive through the suicide of their members
(Hexham 2002).
4 	There were three waves of resource-centered insurgencies in the Delta Niger region. The first
wave was led by Isac Boro in February 1966 with the Niger Delta Volunteers force, which
aimed at excising the Niger Delta from Nigeria. The second wave occurred between 1999 and
2009 and had as its epicenter the movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta. The
third wave emerged with the formation of the Niger Delta Avengers in 2016. However, there
were some periods of nonviolent protests that successfully globalized the Ogoni resistance
against the state-oil business alliance (Oriola and Adeakin 2018).
5 	Séléka was formally dissolved in September 2013 by Michel Djotodia, one of the leaders
of the rebellion who had installed himself as president of the republic after the coup of
24 March 2013. However, this decision did not affect the armed formations that were controlling important areas inside the country. During a meeting in the north of the CAR on
11 May 2014, the Séléka militia formed a new administrative structure and subsequently
moved to the city of Bambari, 400 km from Bangui, the capital.
6 	We propose to explain religious extremism in the CAR through tracing the history of the
power struggle among the elite groups. Ruling elites, including anti-balaka and Séléka,
exploited citizens’ religious and national identities to attain their interests and take over
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natural resources. In addition, regional and international actors have been actively involved
in the conflict, but their policies and strategies toward the CAR mostly reflect their regional
and global interests and ambitions (Siradag 2016).
7 	His opportunism is evident in that after only several months Bokassa abandoned his plans
to establish an Islamic republic in Central Africa and announced his return to the Catholic
Church (Vlavonou 2021).
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